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After finding that approximately ten million people worldwide are 
stateless, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) launched the #IBelong Campaign, which seeks to end the 
global crisis of statelessness within a decade of its launch in November 
2014, by identifying and protecting populations of stateless people and 
preventing further statelessness.1 The UNHCR is working with other UN 
agencies, state governments, civil society, and regional organizations to 
carry out a ten-part Global Action Plan to End Statelessness (“GAP”).2  
The #IBelong Campaign addresses the problem of statelessness by 
building off of the UN’s previous efforts, which began in 1954 with the 
passage of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
(“1954 Convention”) and further developed in 1961 with the Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness (“1961 Convention”) and in 1995 with 
                                                        
 1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR launches 10-year global 
campaign to end statelessness, http://www.unhcr.org/545797f06.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (The 
#IBelong Campaign was launched on November 4, 2014 when the “UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees António Guterres, UNHCR Special Envoy Angelina Jolie and more than 30 celebrities and 
world opinion leaders . . . published an Open Letter, saying that 60 years after the United Nations first 
agreed to protect stateless people, ‘now it’s time to end statelessness itself.’”). The UNHCR also found 
that a baby is born into a stateless status every ten minutes. Id.  
A person is stateless when they are in “the condition of not possessing recognized citizenship in a 
state or nation . . . because they did not acquire a nationality at birth, their state of origin no longer 
exists, or no state will accept them as citizens.” Jay Milbrandt, Adopting the Stateless, 39 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 711 (2014). Caused by governments rather than individuals, statelessness exists and 
continues largely unchecked due to gaps in international law and broad discretion given to state 
sovereignties in defining citizenship, and the state uses its broad discretion to discriminate against 
certain classes of people. Id. at 712. There are two types of statelessness. Id. Statelessness that is “de 
jure” means “there is no recognized state to which a person may claim nationality and citizenship.” Id. 
Statelessness that is “de facto” means “a person possesses a legally meritorious claim for citizenship, 
but is precluded from asserting it because of practical considerations such as cost, circumstances of 
civil disorder, or fear of persecution.” Id. at 713. De facto statelessness consists of “(1) persons who do 
not enjoy the rights attached to their nationality; (2) persons who are unable to establish their 
nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality; (3) persons who, in the context of state succession, 
are attributed the nationality of a state other than the state of their habitual residence.” Id. at 713. 
See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ibelong-campaign-to-end-statelessness.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
2   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness 
Special Appeal (December 2016), at 6, 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/%23IBelong%20Campaign%20to%20End%20Statelessnes
%20Special%20Appeal%20-%20December%202016.pdf?v2. See also United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (November 2014), Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024, at 
2-3, https://www.unhcr.org/protection/statelessness/54621bf49/global-action-plan-end-statelessness-
2014-2024.html.  












the UNHCR’s Global Mandate on Statelessness.3 These measures, taken 
as a whole, attempt to reverse the significant challenges arising out of a 
stateless status, such as a lack of basic identity documentation; a 
diminished access to education, healthcare, and employment; and general 
exclusion, marginalization, discrimination, poverty, and fear.4 
Of the estimated ten million people who the UNHCR has identified as 
stateless, 75% are from minority groups within the state in question.5 One 
such minority is the Rohingya Muslims in the state of Myanmar (formerly 
Burma).6 Although previously recognized as citizens, the Rohingya 
Muslims have been systematically denied citizenship and other rights 
since 1962, beginning under an anti-Muslim military regime and 
continuing under the current democratic regime.7  Systematic oppression 
                                                        
3   Matthew Seet, The Origins of UNHCR’s Global Mandate on Statelessness, 28 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 7 (2016). 
4   David C. Baluarte, The Risk of Statelessness: Reasserting a Rule for the Protection of the 
Right to Nationality, 19 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 47, 48 (2017) (noting that stateless populations in 
every region of the world experience being intentionally marginalized, vulnerable, and discriminated 
against by the state that they inhabit as a result of the lack of legal and physical protections afforded to 
citizens of that state).  See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017 UNHCR 
Statelessness Report, at 2, https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-
content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
5   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017 UNHCR Statelessness Report, at 1, 
http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wpcontent/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2018).  
6   “Rohingya is an ethno-religious term meaning Muslim people whose ancestral home is 
Arakan or Rakhine in Myanmar. To date, the total number of Rohingya in Rakhine State are estimated 
at over one million, the majority of whom live in three townships of North Rakhine State, and the vast 
majority of whom are stateless.” Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of 
Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 681, 683 (2014). It is important to note that it is the 
Rohingya Muslims who are being systematically oppressed and the subjects of multiple atrocities. 
Defining the Rohingya Muslims is important because it distinguishes from the religious and ethnic 
majority, which are the Rakhine Buddhists, in the Rakhine State where the Rohingya Muslims 
historically and currently reside. Id. at 691.  
Although Burma changed its official name to Myanmar in 1989 in an attempt to break from its 
colonial past, there is a difference in approach to referring to the state by its official name. The United 
Nations, France, and Japan are among those who refer to the state as “Myanmar;” however, countries 
like the United States and the United Kingdom continue to use “Burma” because they do not recognize 
the legitimacy of the military regime that changed the name. The two words mean the same thing and 
both have been used in the state. “Burma” is the more colloquial term that is used among the people of 
the state when they speak while “Myanmar” is the formal term used in official documents and 
literature. Should it be Burma or Myanmar? BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7013943.stm.  
When referring to things that are from Myanmar, the term used is “Burmese” rather than some 
other term that derives itself from Myanmar. To avoid confusion and to be consistent with how the 
United States refers to the country, this paper will refer to the state as “Burma” only and will also use 
the term “Burmese” when describing regimes, officials, and other entities within the state.  
7   Zarni, supra note 6, at 683. Successive governments following the Burmese independence 













has resulted in the Rohingya refugee crisis, where more than 671,000 
Rohingya Muslims have fled their homes in the Rakhine State since late 
August 2017 in an attempt to save themselves from ethnic cleansing, mass 
killings, and other crimes against humanity.8 
First, this note will explain the UNHCR provisions and guidance on 
statelessness and the citizenship laws in Burma that create a stateless 
status for the Rohingya Muslims. Second, this note will discuss how 
Burma’s state actions have resulted in a refugee crisis for the Rohingya 
Muslims. Finally, this note will propose possible remedies for the problem 
of statelessness for Rohingya Muslims in Burma and additional solutions 
for the current refugee crisis.  
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND BURMA’S HISTORY 
A. UNHCR Conventions and Global Mandate 
Following World Wars I and II, the United Nations established 
institutions and laws to protect stateless people due to the influx of 
refugees across the European continent.9 The UNHCR provides guidance 
through conventions, protocols, and a global mandate, to States for dealing 
with both refugees and stateless persons.10 These provisions lay out the 
                                                        
8   Human Rights Watch, Rohingya Crisis, https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya-crisis (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018). The UNHCR provides a different estimate: “The latest exodus began on 25 August 
2017, when violence broke out in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, driving more than 742,000 to seek refuge 
in Bangladesh. Most arrived in the first three months of the crisis. An estimated 12,000 reached 
Bangladesh during the first half of 2018. The vast majority reaching Bangladesh are women and 
children, and more than 40 per cent are under age 12. Many others are elderly people requiring 
additional aid and protection.” UNHCR, Rohingya emergency (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html.  
9   Milbrandt, supra note 1, at 714.  
10  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Introductory Note to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (May 2014). It is important to note that refugees 
and stateless persons can be two separate categories, but there can also be an overlap between the two 
classifications: 
“Indeed, some refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention may also be 
stateless, and some stateless persons may be refugees. When this happens 
international law provides that they ‘should be protected according to the higher 
standard which in most circumstances will be international refugee law, not least 
due to the protection from refoulement in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’. However, most refugees today are not stateless, and not all stateless 
persons are refugees, thus the two classifications are and remain distinct.” 
Helene Lambert, Comparative Perspectives on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 
and Refugee Status, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2 (2015). Prevention of one category may 
lead to prevention of the other, such as providing “effective nationality and the ability to 
exercise the rights inherent to nationality” can prevent statelessness which may lead to 
refugeehood or providing rights to refugees may prevent statelessness. Id. at 4.  












basic principles and rights that refugees and stateless persons can expect 
from the international community.11 Although Burma is not a signatory to 
any of these laws, the provisions are helpful in understanding how the 
international community may hold Burma accountable for its violations of 
the protections found in these conventions and protocols.12 
The first of these provisions is the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“1951 Convention”), which holds that “[t]he 
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to 
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”13 
If a person falls within any of the exceptions listed in Article 1, Paragraphs 
C, D, E, or F, they may not be covered by the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.14 The Rohingya Muslims do not fall in any of the 
exceptions because they have not voluntarily availed themselves of the 
protections or nationality of Burma, they are only receiving assistance 
from the UNHCR, have not received nationality in the countries that have 
taken them in, and have not committed any act that is contrary to the 
United Nation’s purpose.15 Therefore, the 1951 Convention would apply 
to the Rohingya Muslims. 
                                                        
11  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Introductory Note to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (May 2014). 
12  See generally, United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2018); United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, https://treaties.un.org/pages/  
ViewDetailsII. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2018); United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
4&chapter=5&clang=_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2018); and United Nations Treaty Collection, Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).  
 13 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 3, July 28, 1951. 
14  Id. at art. 1.  
15  See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 ¶ C, July 28, 1951 
(Convention does not apply to any person who voluntarily re-avails himself of protection from country 
of nationality, voluntarily re-acquires protection after losing nationality, gains new nationality, 
reestablishes himself in another country out of fear of persecution, refuses without compelling reason 
the protection from the country of nationality after he no longer is recognized as a refugee, or is able to 
return to the country of former residence in the event there is no nationality); Id. at ¶ D (“This 
Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the 
United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or 
assistance”). Id. at ¶ E (“This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the 
competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and 
obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country”). Id. at ¶ F 
(Convention does not apply to one who “(a) has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 














Another important provision of the 1951 Convention is its prohibition 
of refoulement, where a state cannot “expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”16 This 
provision is especially important because countries, like Bangladesh, 
receiving the Rohingya Muslims in their refugee camps may prematurely 
send the Rohingya Muslims back to Burma, where they will likely 
continue to face mass killings, sexual violence, and other crimes against 
humanity on account of their ethnic and religious identities.17 Although 
Bangladesh is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention, the country may 
still be subject to its provisions.18 Under Article 56 of the 1945 United 
Nations Charter, every member State of the United Nations has a general 
obligation to cooperate with the United Nations and its agencies.19 Thus, 
the duty to protect refugees is extended to all states, even if they have not 
signed the 1951 Convention, because they must adhere to the United 
Nations Charter.20  
The 1951 Convention was amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”), which gave the 1951 
Convention universal coverage to all refugees, replacing the original 
limitations that restricted the application of the 1951 Convention to only 
                                                                                                                              
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations”). 
16  Id. at art. 33 ¶ 1.  
 17  Myanmar / Bangladesh: Rohingya refugees must not be forced home to abuse and 
discrimination, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-must-not-
be-forced-home-to-abuses-and-discrimination/.  
18  See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
19  U.N. Charter art. 56, ¶ 1 (“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55”). The 
purposes listed in Article 55 include “the creation of conditions of stability and well-being…peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations…respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples…higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; 
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.” Id. at art. 55. All members of the United Nations must accept the obligations found in the 
Charter of the United Nations. Id. at art. 4 (“Membership in the United Nations is open to all other 
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment 
of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations”).  
20  Moira Sy, UNHCR and Preventing Indirect Refoulement in Europe, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
457, 459 (2015). 












those refugees who were fleeing the consequences of World War II in 
Europe.21 The change reflects the recognition that new refugee situations 
can arise anywhere in the world at any time and that refugees should be 
covered by the 1951 Convention equally.22 
Although the United Nations General Assembly convened a 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951 to draft an international treaty on 
the protection of both refugees and stateless persons, only the 1951 
Convention providing protections for refugees was agreed to, so 
negotiations continued on the subject of stateless persons.23 These 
negotiations resulted in the adoption of the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons (“1954 Convention”), which entered into 
force on June 6, 1960.24 The 1954 Convention defined a stateless person as 
“a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the 
operation of its law.”25 States cannot discriminate against stateless persons 
“as to race, religion or country of origin.”26 However, there are some 
exceptions that apply, which are similar to the ones found in the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol.27 The 1954 Convention requires States to 
afford stateless persons the same freedom of religion given to nationals, 
the same or greater right of association and right to wage-earning 
employment as that given to aliens in that country, and the same right to 
elementary education given to nationals and the same or greater right to 
higher education as that given to aliens in that country.28  
                                                        
21  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 ¶ 2-3 (“For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term ‘refugee’ 
shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the 
definition of article I of the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and . . .’ and the words ‘. . . as a result of such events’, in article I A (2) were omitted. 
The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic 
limitation…”).  
22  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Preamble.  
23  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Introductory Note to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, at 3. 
24  Id. 
25  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1 ¶ 1. 
26  Id. at art. 3.  
27  Id. at art. 1 ¶ 2(i-iii) (The 1954 Convention does not apply to (i) people receiving protection 
or assistance from institutions other than the UNHCR, (ii) people who are recognized “as having the 
rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country,” and (iii) 
to people who have committed a crime against peace, war crime, crime against humanity, serious non-
political crime, or acts that are “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”).  
28  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Relating to the 














Of particular importance in the context of the Rohingya Muslims are 
the provisions related to the freedom of movement, right to identity papers 
and travel documents, and protection from expulsion.29 Burmese 
authorities require the Rohingya Muslims to carry special documents and 
travel permits for internal movement, restrict them to movement within 
only five areas of the northern Rakhine State, and require prior approval 
for leaving the village of their residence.30 These restrictions on movement 
limit both their access to higher education and employment.31 To make 
matters worse, the Rohingya Muslims who leave Burma are not able to 
return to their residences because they are given jail sentences for illegally 
entering the country.32 Burma passed the Emergency Immigration Act in 
the mid-1970s, which required all citizens to possess National Registration 
Certificates; however, the Rohingya Muslims were only issued Foreign 
Registration Cards, and many schools and employers would not accept this 
                                                                                                                              
territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to 
practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children.”). Id. at art. 15 
(“As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions the Contracting States 
shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible, 
and in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.”). Id. at art. 17 ¶ 1 (“The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully 
staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than 
that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-
earning employment.”). Id. at art. 22 ¶ 1 (“The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons the 
same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.”). Id. at art. 22 ¶ 2 
(“The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons treatment as favourable as possible and, in 
any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with 
respect to education other than elementary education . . .”).  
29  Id. at art. 26 (“Each Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons lawfully in its territory 
the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any 
regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”). Id. at art. 27 (“The Contracting 
States shall issue identity papers to any stateless person in their territory who does not possess a valid 
travel document.”). Id. at art. 28 (“The Contracting States shall issue to stateless persons lawfully 
staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless 
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the 
Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents.”). Id. at art. 31 (“The 
Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their territory save on grounds of 
national security or public order.” If the state determines that a person should be expelled, that state 
must give the stateless person due process of law and a reasonable amount of time to find legal 
admission into another state.).  
30  U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 2012, 23 (2012). 
31  Id.  
32  Melissa Stewart, “Rotting of the Flower”: Persecution of the Rohingya Threatens 
Myanmar’s Democratic Transition & Further Perils the Right to a Nationality, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
437, 440 (“In 2007, Rohingya trying to return to Myanmar by boat were given seven-year jail 
sentences for illegally entering the country. This prohibition on return gives some weight to claims that 
the violence and displacement of Rohingya amounts to ethnic cleansing.”).  












form of identity documentation.33 The Burmese government refuses to 
acknowledge the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims, and Burmese 
President Thein Sein even recommended “the mass expulsion of the 
Rohingya to ‘third countries’ or UNHCR camps” in response to the 
internal and external displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya 
Muslims from the Rakhine State as a result of state violence.34 These 
actions by the Burmese government directly violate the provisions of the 
1954 Convention.35  
While the 1954 Convention laid out the basic principles for preventing 
statelessness, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
(“1961 Convention”) sets rules for limiting situations where statelessness 
arises.36 In doing so, the 1961 Convention gives effect to everyone’s right 
to a nationality found in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.37 The 1961 Convention provides that “A Contracting State shall 
grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise 
be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted: (a) at birth, by operation of 
law, or (b) upon an application….”38 Furthermore, “[a] Contracting State 
shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would 
render him stateless.”39  Finally, “[a] Contracting State may not deprive 
any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, 
religious or political grounds.”40 Burma’s citizenship law violates each of 
these provisions, thus rendering the Rohingya Muslims stateless according 
to the 1954 and 1961 Conventions.41  
                                                        
33  Engy Abdelkader, The Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar: Past, Present, and Future, 15 OR. 
REV. INT’L L. 393, 396 (2013). Beginning in the 1990s, the Rohingya Muslims were “able to register 
as temporary residents with identification cards, known as white cards,” which “conferred limited 
rights but were not recognized as proof of citizenship.” Eleanor Albert and Andrew Chatzky, The 
Rohingya Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis 
(last updated Jan. 23, 2020). One of the limited rights conferred by the white cards was the right to 
vote; however, in February 2015 President Thein Sein canceled the white cards after Buddhist 
nationalists protested the Rohingya Muslims’ right to vote in the 2015 constitutional referendum. Id.  
34  Abdelkader, supra note 33, at 397. 
35  See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 25, at art. 3, 
26-28, 31. 
36  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Introductory Note to the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, at 3. 
37  Id. 
38  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness, art. 1 ¶ 1.  
39  Id. at art. 8 ¶ 1.  
40  Id. at art. 9.  














Neither the 1954 Convention nor the 1961 Convention tasked any unit 
or agency to attend to the issue of stateless, possibly because the United 
Nations felt that statelessness would decrease on its own once States 
became fully independent.42 In 1995, the UNHCR’s Executive Committee 
adopted the Conclusion on Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and 
Protection of Stateless Persons (“Global Mandate”), which mandated the 
UNHCR to promote compliance with the 1954 and 1961 Conventions and 
provide technical and advisory assistance to States as they implement the 
provisions of the Conventions in their national legislation.43 The Global 
Mandate seeks to identify stateless persons through research and first-hand 
information, prevent statelessness by advising governments on citizenship 
laws and documentation, reduce statelessness by expanding access to 
nationality, protect the basic human rights of stateless people until 
nationality can be acquired, and protect stateless persons from “indefinite 
detention, trafficking and violence.”44 
B. Burma History and Demographics 
In 1948, Burma gained independence from Great Britain.45 In 1962, a 
one-party, military state was established after a military coup.46 While the 
Burmese military carried out a number of human rights violations against 
the Rohingya Muslims under the military state, the most notable instances 
occurred in 1977 and 1992, which marked the beginning of the Rohingya 
Refugee Crisis.47 In 1977, the Burmese government cracked down on 
illegal immigration, resulting in killings, mass arrests, torture, and other 
abuses against the Rohingya Muslims.48 More than 200,000 Rohingya 
Muslims fled to Bangladesh, which attempted to drive the refugees out by 
starving and forcibly returning them to Burma.49 In 1992, another military 
crackdown resulted in more than a quarter-million Rohingya Muslims 
fleeing to Bangladesh only to receive the same treatment as in 1977.50  
                                                        
42  Maryellen Fullerton, Comparative Perspectives on Statelessness and Persecution, 63 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 863, 866-867 (2015).  
43  Seet, supra note 3, at 10.  
44  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, How UNHCR Helps Stateless People, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/how-unhcr-helps-stateless-people.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
45  Abdelkader, supra note 33, at 394. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 394-395.  
48  Id. At 395 n.12. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 395 n.13. 












In 1982, Burma passed the Citizenship Law (sometimes referred to as 
Citizenship Act), which recognized 135 national races.51 The Rohingya 
were excluded from this list, thus making them noncitizens and thereby 
limiting their ability to receive education and employment, move freely 
throughout the country, own property, get married and family plan.52 The 
Burmese government carried out campaigns of mass killings, rape, and 
property destruction in 1978, 1992, and 2001, leading to an exodus of 
thousands of Rohingya Muslims across the border; moreover, in 2008 and 
2009, Rohingya refugee boats were turned away from Thailand.53 
Sectarian violence beginning in 2012 and continuing until the present has 
resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, in 
addition to persecution, beatings, arrests, and obstruction from 
humanitarian access.54 
On August 25, 2017, “the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 
claimed responsibility for coordinated attacks against 30 security outposts 
in northern Rakhine State, killing 12 security personnel.”55 Burmese 
security forces and local vigilante groups then responded with widespread 
atrocities against Rohingya villagers.56 These atrocities included 
extrajudicial killings, lethal force against civilians, planting land mines 
along the Bangladesh border to kill refugees leaving from or returning to 
Burma, disappearances based on alleged connections with ARSA, gang 
and mass rapes of women, torture and abuse against prisoners and 
detainees, police beatings and arbitrary arrests, and arson of homes, 
religious buildings, and other buildings.57 As of December 2018, the 
                                                        
51  Id. at 395-396. 
52  Id. at 396. “The Burmese Citizenship law affects Rohingya adults and children alike. A 
specific provision of the law requires government authorization for marriage, as well as a ‘two-child 
policy.’ These restrictions have made Rohingya children ‘‘evidence' of unregistered marriages, an act 
punishable by up to ten years in prison.’ Should a family choose to have more than two children, each 
subsequent child who is unregistered becomes ‘blacklisted for life, unable to travel, attend school, or 
get married.’ These stateless children, along with men and women, confront inadequate healthcare and 
starvation, resulting in avoidable health problems.” Amanda Crews Slezak, Thalia Roussos Singer, and 
Rupa Ramadurai, Stateless and Fleeing Persecution: The Situation of the Rohingya in Thailand, 35 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 44, 45 (2015). 
53  Zawacki, supra note 41, at 18. 
54  Abdelkader, supra note 33, at 397. 
55  U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, BURMA 2017 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT, at 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Burma.pdf (last visited Nov. 
4, 2018). 
 56  Id. 













atrocities internally displaced an unknown number of Rohingya and 
externally displaced more than 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh.58  
II. DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP 
Although the Rohingya Muslims have lived in the Rakhine State of 
Burma for centuries, the Burmese government refers to them as 
“undocumented immigrants” and “Bengalis,” and even excluded them 
entirely from the 2014 Census.59 The Burmese government has 
accomplished the exclusion of the Rohingya Muslims through the 
enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law.60 The denial of citizenship and the 
denial of benefits and rights as a result have led to growing tensions 
between the Burmese government and the Rohingya Muslims, culminating 
into what has “said to be the world’s fasted growing refugee crisis.”61 
 
A. 1982 Citizenship Law 
 
In relevant part, the 1982 Citizenship Law states, “Nationals such as the 
Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic 
groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as 
their permanent home from a period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are 
Burma citizens.”62 The 1982 Citizenship also provides two other 
categories for citizenship: associate citizens and naturalized citizens.63  
                                                        
58  Id. at 1. See also, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
BURMA 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, at 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/BURMA-2018.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
59  Slezak, supra note 52, at 44. See also Zarni, supra note 6, at 683 (“In Myanmar’s state 
media, official policy documents, and school textbooks, the Rohingya are referred to as Bengali, a 
racist local reference, and are portrayed as illegal economic migrants from the colonial time, who are a 
‘threat to national security, a portrayal that the bulk of the Burmese have accepted as a fact over the 
past five decades.”). See also Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC 
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561. 
60  Slezak, supra note 52, at 44. 
61  BBC NEWS, supra note 59.  
62  Burma Citizenship Law, Ch. 2 (1982), 
www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/87413/99608/.../MMR87413.pdf.  
63  See generally Burma Citizenship Law, Ch. 3. “If a person cannot provide evidence that his 
ancestors settled in Burma before 1823, he or she can be classified as an associate citizen if one 
grandparent, or pre-1823 ancestor, was a citizen of another country. Those persons who qualified for 
citizenship under the 1948 law, but who would no longer qualify under this new law, are also 
considered associate citizens if they had applied for citizenship in 1948.” Human Rights Watch, 
Discrimination in Arakan, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018). See also Burma Citizenship Law, Ch. 4. “To become a naturalized citizen, a person 
must be able to provide ‘conclusive evidence’ that he or his parents entered and resided in Burma prior 
to independence in 1948. Persons who have at least one parent who holds one of the three types of 
 












Most Rohingya Muslims have not been granted nationality under any of 
the three classes of citizens.64 In addition to limiting citizenship based on a 
finding of presence on or before 1823, the Burmese government also 
limits citizenship to “individuals who belong to one of the 130 recognized 
national ethnic groups, none of which included the Rohingya.”65 Even if a 
Rohingya Muslim is somehow able to provide conclusive evidence of their 
parents entering and residing in Burma before 1948, the Burmese 
government still has discretion to deny citizenship by implementing the 
law in a discriminatory way,  so enforcement is uniformly imposed on the 
Rohingya Muslims alone rather than all excluded groups.66 The UNHCR 
estimates that over one million people have become stateless as a result of 
this denial of citizenship.67 
There are several issues with the 1982 Citizenship Law. First, it is 
almost impossible for the Rohingya to produce ‘conclusive evidence’ of 
their ancestry that dates back to 1823, so they are not able to become full 
citizens, associate citizens, or naturalized citizens.68 Along with attacking 
the right to self-identity and being “based on deeply flawed and out-dated 
notions about race and ethnic identity formation that were prevalent during 
the colonial period in Myanmar,” the high standards needed to obtain 
naturalization or demonstrate associate citizenship are also not compliant 
with the 1954 and 1961 Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and other international laws.69 Second, the 1982 Citizenship Law 
does not provide safeguards for stateless children born in Burma to acquire 
citizenship at birth if they do not have another nationality that they can 
obtain.70 Since children are being born into a stateless condition, the 
number of stateless persons in Burma will only increase.71  Third, the 1982 
Citizenship Law provides the basis for further systematic and severe 
                                                                                                                              
Burmese citizenship are also eligible. Beyond these two qualifications, Section 44 of the act stipulates 
that the person must be eighteen years old, be able to speak well one of the national languages (the 
Rohingya language, a dialect related to Chittagonian, is not one), be of good character, and be of sound 
mind.” Human Rights Watch, Discrimination in Arakan, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
64  Slezak, supra note 52, at 47. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness Special Appeal, supra note 2, at 24. 
68  Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law and Rohingya 
(December 2014). 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 













abuses of human rights.72 Among the most basic human rights that the 
Rohingya Muslims have been denied are the freedom to believe and 
practice the religion of one’s choice.73  
As mentioned earlier, the Rohingya Muslims are restricted in their right 
to free movement within the Rakhine State, other parts of Burma, and 
outside the country.74 This restriction is a violation of the well-established 
principle of the freedom of movement set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international laws, such as the 
1954 and 1961 Conventions.75 The Rohingya Muslims are restricted in 
their access to education because they are not able to receive state-run 
secondary education, which the Burmese government provides for citizens 
only.76 Many Rohingya only receive up to primary education, as private 
secondary education is limited or unavailable.77 The Rohingya Muslims 
are restricted in their employment because they cannot be employed in 
civil service positions, such as teachers, health workers, or government 
workers because these positions are available only to citizens.78 In 
addition, it is common for the Rohingya Muslims to be forced into unpaid 
labor and be subject to arbitrary confiscation of property as a result of lack 
of citizenship.79 With the heavy military presence in the Rakhine State, the 
Rohingya are often threatened with detention, fines, or worse if they do 
not comply with military orders.80  
 
B. Rohingya Refugee Crisis and Refoulement 
 
Since August 2017, more than 720,000 stateless Rohingya refugees 
have found shelter and safety in Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, which 
already hosted an estimated 200,000 Rohingya refugees due to previous 
                                                        
72  Id. 
73  Abdelkader, supra note 33, at 401-402 (“Article 34 of the Burmese 2008 Constitution states, 
‘Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice 
religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution.’” 
However, since the Rohingya Muslims are not considered to be citizens, the state is not obligated to 
provide this right to them, even if it is a significant violation of international laws and norms.).  
74  Human Rights Watch, supra note 63. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. The gap between Burmese Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims is exacerbated by not 
just a lack of employment opportunities but also poor infrastructure and widespread poverty, as the 
“Rakhine State is Myanmar’s least developed state, with a poverty rate of 78 percent, compared to the 
37.5 percent national average, according to World Bank estimates.” Albert, supra note 33.  
79  Human Rights Watch, supra note 63.  
80  Id. 












displacements occurring as a result of violence and discrimination in 
Burma.81  The Cox Bazar camp has one of the densest concentrations of 
refugees in the world.82 A new Joint Response Plan was launched in 
February 2019, requesting $920.5 million to provide life-saving assistance, 
such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical care, to 1.2 million 
Rohingya refugees and local host communities.83 As of April 2019, only 
17% of the appeal has been met.84 The camps already have such little 
funding, and it will be costly to address issues that may arise from 
monsoons, which can cause floods and landslides.85 Thus, the refugee 
camp must be reinforced against latrines overflowing which can lead to 
health risks, like cholera and other waterborne diseases.86 Additionally, 
relocating such a mass of people, mostly women and children, will also 
pose difficulties since the refugees are already so concentrated.87   
In November 2017, Burma and Bangladesh reached a deal, which was 
finalized in January 2018, to repatriate 1,500 Rohingya Muslims each 
week.88 The goal of this deal was to return all 781,000 refugees within two 
                                                        
81  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Rohingya emergency one year on: Asia’s 
most recent refugee crisis warrants international solidarity and progress on solutions, UNHCR USA 
(Aug. 24, 2018), http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2018/8/5b7fc7174/rohingya-emergency-year-
asias-recent-refugee-crisis-warrants-international.html.  
Besides the 720,000 refugees in Cox Bazar, there are about 5,000 displaced Rohingya Muslims 
living in the camp at Tombru checkpoint, located about 30 miles from Cox Bazar, which is a strip of 
land inside Burma’s territory but fenced off from the rest of the country and separated from 
Bangladesh by a small canal. Anbarasan Ethirajan, Myanmar’s Rohingya stuck in Bangladesh’s ‘no 
man’s land,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43458014. These 
displaced Rohingya Muslims are able to cross into Bangladesh to receive food and healthcare, but they 
are not allowed to enter through the checkpoint to return to their homes in Burma. Id. The displaced 
Rohingya living in this “no man’s land” are heavily monitored by Burmese guards, with the 
government claiming the security measures are due to risks of militants living amongst the displaced 
Rohingya Muslims. Id. 
82  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Rohingya Refugee 
Crisis, https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).  
83  Id. 
84  Id.  
85  Somini Sengupta & Henry Fountain, The Biggest Refugee Camp Braces for Rain: “This is 
Going to Be a Catastrophe,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/climate/bangladesh-rohingya-refugee-camp.html.  
86  Id.  
87  Id. 
88  Elliot Higgins, Transitional Justice for the Persecution of the Rohingya, 42 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 101, 110 (2018). In November 2018, the joint authorities of Bangladesh and Burma planned to 
return about 2,000 Rohingya to Burma, but protests within the refugee camps resulted in these plans 
being halted, as many of the Rohingya expressed concerns that a returning them to Burma would 
essentially be like sending them to their death. Rohingya return to Myanmar: Confusion and fear in 
refugee camps, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46217505.  
The Burmese government states that it will provide temporary shelters, medical care, and food 














years.89 This agreement was criticized for being unsafe and premature.90 
After the first attempt failed, other unsuccessful attempts to repatriate the 
Rohingya refugees occurred in November 2018 and again in August 2019, 
with the Rohingya refusing to return each time.91 Without an end to the 
violence and discriminatory laws in the country, any repatriation operation 
can run the risk of violating the refoulement provisions found in 
international law, such as in the 1951 Convention.92  
Bangladesh has suggested creating “safe zones” for the Rohingya 
Muslims to return to in Burma; however, these safe zones have a high 
                                                                                                                              
Rohingya back to Burma until the root causes of the violence and discrimination have been properly 
addressed. Nick Beake, What awaits any Rohingya refugees who return to Myanmar?, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46312889. There are also fears that the 
returning Rohingyas will be subject to the supposed protection of the very army that executed their 
genocide in the first place. Id. Furthermore, the Burmese government continues to refuse to grant 
citizenship to the Rohingya Muslims, only offering limited movement within the country using a 
National Verification Card, which may effectively give the Rohingya Muslims the status of “unlawful 
aliens from a foreign land.” Id. The treatment of returning Rohingyas will likely resemble the 
treatment of those who are currently residing in Burma, where they are confined to camps that are 
essentially open-air prisons and continue to face threats of violence. Id.  
 89  Higgins, supra note 88, at 110. 
90  Id.  
91  Helen Regan & Stella Ko, Rohingya say no to repatriations around anniversary of atrocities, 
CNN (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/22/asia/rohingya-repatriation-myanmar-concern-
intl-hnk/index.html. See also Azeem Ibrahim, What Myanmar must do before taking back a single 
refugee, CNN (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/30/opinions/rohingya-repatriation-
myanmar-intl/index.html. “The first batch of about 1,200 returnees was supposed to be sent home in 
January 2018. That plan was delayed by the Bangladeshi government, after an international outcry 
over the idea of returning traumatized victims to the epicenter of one of the worst eruptions of ethnic 
cleansing in this century.” Hannah Beech, Massacred at Home, in Misery Abroad, 730,000 Rohingya 
Are Mired in Hopelessness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-repatriation.html (updated Jan. 
23, 2020). When the 2018 attempt failed, “the two countries promised in April 2018 to proceed with 
safe, voluntary and dignified repatriations, several new deadlines were set. None were met. Most 
recently, the Myanmar government said the repatriation of 3,450 Rohingya would begin on Thursday. 
That target, too, passed with no movement across the border.” Id. “Maintaining the fiction that 
repatriations are about to occur is politically useful for” both Burma and Bangladesh, as the first is 
eager to establish its innocence in allegations of human rights violations and the second is “struggling 
with overpopulation and poverty.” Id. 
92  Myanmar / Bangladesh: Rohingya refugees must not be forced home to abuse and 
discrimination, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-must-not-
be-forced-home-to-abuses-and-discrimination/. Furthermore, “UNHCR has agreed with the 
governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar that any repatriation of refugees must be voluntary, safe 
and dignified. Respect for these principles will also have the practical effect of helping to ensure that 
return is sustainable . . . Many [refugees] stated that they do hope to go home to Myanmar as soon as 
conditions allow and that assurances regarding their citizenship status, freedom of movement, and 
security in Myanmar could be provided.” UNHCR Statement on Voluntary Repatriation to Myanmar, 
UNHCR (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/8/5d5e720a4/unhcr-
statement-voluntary-repatriation-myanmar.html (emphasis added). 












chance of becoming like the displacement camps that are already in place 
in Burma.93 The camps for internally displaced people in Burma have 
restricted humanitarian access due to the Burmese security forces 
intimidating and detaining staff members for relief organizations.94 
Moreover, the displaced Rohingya Muslims in these camps are prevented 
from returning to their homes by Burmese security forces, which leaves 
them trapped with no water, poor sanitation, and worsening conditions due 
to Burma’s rainy season.95  
To avoid any violations of the principle of refoulement, the Rohingya 
Muslims must voluntarily leave the refugee camps and return to Burma, 
and despite the deal reached between Burma and Bangladesh, their return 
would not be voluntary.96 Given that they will return to a country where 
they are still discriminated against as noncitizens and restricted from 
receiving the benefits of this citizenship, such as the freedom of 
movement, education, employment, marriage, and property, it seems 
unlikely that the Rohingya Muslims will return to Burma willingly.97 The 
                                                        
93  Id.  
94  Stewart, supra note 32, at 438. For both the Rohingya Muslims who are internally displaced 
within Burma and those who have been forced into Bangladesh, one of the most critical restrictions to 
humanitarian aid relates to access to adequate healthcare. Timothy McLaughlin and Shibani Mahtani, 
Myanmar’s Buddhists block Rohingya Muslims from blood supplies, report says, WASH. POST (Dec. 
24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmars-buddhists-block-rohingya-
muslims-from-blood-supplies-report-says/2018/12/23/d08157c8-02af-11e9-8186-
4ec26a485713_story.html?utm_term=.908fe1f90ed6. The Rohingya Muslims are “effectively blocked 
from accessing the blood bank in the main medical facility in the western Rakhine state” because 
Burmese Buddhists believe their blood should only be given to other Buddhists, and hospitals comply 
with this belief. Id. When the Rohingya Muslims are able to access medical facilities, they are treated 
unkindly and are neglected by the hospital staff. Id. Additionally, the Rohingya Muslims face a heavier 
financial burden because they must pay bribes to guards, drivers, nurses, and doctors to be safely 
transported and treated at the hospital. Id. Rohingya Muslims may pay about 61% more than a 
Buddhist with the same condition just to be admitted to a hospital for several days. Id.  
95  Stewart, supra note 32, at 439. 
96  In Thailand, there have also been threats to forcibly return these refugees to Burma. There 
have been human rights violations, such as the freedom of movement and right to work, of the 
approximately 110,000 Rohingya refugees living in the nine designated refugee camps in Thailand. 
The scrutiny faced for these violation “combined with decreases in resources and services—including 
access to adequate food, shelter, health care, and educational services—have created conditions which 
threaten to coercively return these refugees to Myanmar. Repatriation in this manner is not truly 
voluntary, but is instead a form of constructively forced return,” and would violate the principle of 
nonrefoulement. Zach Hudson, Stranglehold Refoulement: Fear of Constructively Forced Returns of 
Burmese Refugees as Consequence of Thailand’s Combined Human Rights Violations, 40 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 329, 334 (2017).  
97  See supra notes 30-34, 52, and 70-75. Another reason why Rohingya refugees are unlikely to 
return is the “major fighting” and troop build-ups that occurred in early January 2019, which displaced 
about 4,500 Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State. Amid troop build-up in Rohingya’s home state, 
UN appeals to Myanmar for peaceful solution, UN NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019), 














Rohingya must be given other options besides returning to Burma, such as 
seeking protection from the international community.98 If the Rohingya do 
return, their repatriation must be supervised by the UNHCR.99 Having the 
Rohingya return to Burma without the corresponding changes in the law 




III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE STATELESSNESS PROBLEM IN BURMA 
A. Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 
 
One possible solution to the statelessness problem in Burma is to 
change the legal framework in Burma by implementing the GAP. The 
GAP consists of ten actions or goals that the UNHCR hopes to achieve by 
the year 2024.101 The GAP sets out the starting point, goals to be achieved, 
milestones and interim targets for 2017 and 2020, many of which can 
                                                                                                                              
“crush” insurgents of the Arakan Army. Id. However, the United Nations fears that this violence will 
lead to a new wave of migration, as roughly 600,000 Rohingya Muslims are still in Burma, and the 
UNHCR already is unable to deliver the necessary humanitarian assistance to more than 700,000 
refugees in Bangladesh. Id. While there is a ceasefire in place in northern and eastern Burmese states, 
the Rakhine State is not included, which heightens the threat of greater displacement. Id. 
98  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 92. 
99  See Sy, supra note 20, at 460. 
100  “In the 1990s and early 2000s, tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees were returned from 
Bangladesh to Myanmar in a large-scale repatriation operation, with the assistance of the UN Refugee 
Agency, UNHCR. Those returned have continued to face systematic state-sponsored discrimination 
and waves of violence in Rakhine state.” AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 92. 
101  See generally #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness Special Appeal, supra note 2. The 
GAP consists of the following action steps, which are not all required because the causes of, 
populations affected by, and magnitude of statelessness varies greatly from one country to the next. As 
such, countries may adopt one or more of these actions, and the UNHCR will assist agencies, 
organizations, civil society, and governments in implementing the relevant actions: 
“Action 1: Resolve existing major situations of statelessness.  
Action 2: Ensure that no child is born stateless.  
Action 3: Remove gender discrimination from nationality laws.  
Action 4: Prevent denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds.  
Action 5: Prevent statelessness in cases of State succession.  
Action 6: Grant protection status to stateless migrants and facilitate their naturalization.  
Action 7: Ensure birth registration for the prevention of statelessness.  
Action 8: Issue nationality documentation to those with entitlement to it.  
Action 9: Accede to the UN Statelessness Conventions.  
Action 10: Improve quantitative and qualitative data on stateless populations.” 
Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014 – 2024, supra note 2, at 2-3.  












serve more than one action.102 Of the ten actions, resolving existing 
statelessness situations (Action 1), granting nationality to children born in 
the State’s territory (Action 2), and acceding to the 1954 and 1961 
Conventions (Action 9), are the most relevant actions for Burma to 
eradicate statelessness within its territory.103 Reforming the 1982 
Citizenship Law to conform with the obligations set forth in the 1954 and 
1961 Conventions will help to eradicate statelessness permanently in 
Burma, and by extension, it will expand access to citizenship and the 
rights that come with nationality.104 Additionally, reforming the 1982 
Citizenship Law so that it supports “birth registration activities, in 
particular in the context of the Ministerial Declaration and accompanying 
Regional Action Framework on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in 
Asia and the Pacific region, will also be essential for enhancing protection 
of stateless people and to prevent new cases of statelessness” that occur 
when children are born to Rohingya Muslims within the Burmese 
territory.105 
Part of the difficulty with making progress on the goals of the 1954 and 
1961 Conventions and the plans, such as the GAP, used to execute these 
goals is that the United Nations has little enforcement power.106 Without a 
Member State willing to cooperate with the UNHCR, the most that the 
agency can do is advocate for its policies, which are not legally binding, 
and possibly intervene through international courts, which are legally 
binding but difficult to enforce.107  
                                                        
102  Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014 – 2024, supra note 2,. at 5.  
103  Id. at 2-3. See also #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness Special Appeal, supra note 2, at 
24 (listing the UNHCR’s Vision for 2019). See generally, supra notes 28-29, 38-40.  
104  #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness Special Appeal, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining the 
strategy and partnerships the UNHCR will use to achieve goals that are specific to Burma’s 
statelessness situation).  
105  Id. at 24-25 (“UNHCR, in collaboration with UNICEF, will undertake advocacy 
interventions with the aim of having 5,000 children of concern obtaining birth certificates.”). 
106  See Sy, supra note 20, at 464.  
107  Id. (“To facilitate implementation, UNHCR uses two main methods: advocacy through the 
release of guidelines and public statements, and court interventions. UNHCR seeks to influence 
legislation by assisting the drafting process and commenting on its compliance with international 
obligations. In practice, states do not recognize UNHCR statements as a source of legal obligations. 
They are considered authoritative but are not legally binding.”). While individual complaints are not 
allowed by the UNHCR mandate, States may complain to the International Court of Justice when non-
compliance occurs under Article 38 of the 1951 Convention; however, no State has exercised this 
right. Id. This means that rights can only be enforced by national governments and the State’s courts, 
so when countries, like Burma, do not adopt the standards and practices set forth by the UNHCR at all, 
let alone simply diverging in the interpretation of the UNHCR’s guidance, individuals usually have no 













Since it does not have much hard power, the UNHCR must resort to 
soft power to encourage States to adopt their policies and plans, which can 
be seen in the vagueness of statements made in UNHCR reports.108 
However, soft power seems unlikely to solve the statelessness problem in 
Burma, especially since the Burmese government continues to act in ways 
that indicate it intends to make the exodus of Rohingya Muslims from the 
country permanent.109 The treatment of the internally displaced Rohingya 
Muslims further indicates an unwillingness by the Burmese government to 
expand citizenship or afford the Rohingya Muslims with any of the rights 
attached to nationality, most notably the freedom of movement, access to 
education, and access to healthcare.110 
                                                        
108  For example, in the 2017 evaluation of Burma’s progress towards the GAP milestones, the 
UNHCR recognizes its own limitations, such as that the agency will “promote” or “support” or 
“advocate” for certain goals and engage with local communities only “upon request,” implying a 
secondary role to national governments who must carry out the policies themselves. #IBelong 
Campaign to End Statelessness Special Appeal, supra note 2, at 25. The same report makes statements 
that indicate a general principle but no concrete action for how to practically implement that principle, 
such as that the “UNHCR will promote a common understanding of the human rights situation for 
stateless people and develop coordinated and concrete advocacy points order to promote a common 
understanding.” Id. Despite using the words “coordinated and concrete,” there is no mention for how 
the UNHCR will bring the national governments in question to the table so that this understanding can 
be reached. The lack of authority and subsequent progress is apparent in the fact that Burma’s 
government continues to refuse to grant nationality to the Rohingya. See Beake, supra note 88. 
109  Following the flight of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from the country, Burmese 
authorities burned down villages, bulldozed the remains, and replaced them with homes for Rakhine 
Buddhists and new facilities for security forces. Poppy McPherson, Simon Lewis, Thu Thu Aung, 
Shoon Naing & Zeba Siddiqui, Erasing the Rohingya: Myanmar’s moves could mean refugees never 
return, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-
rohingya-return/. The goal of these actions, beginning in August 2017, around the same time the 
Bangladeshi and Burmese government were negotiating the return of the Rohingya refugees to Burma, 
was to make the area unrecognizable to the Rohingya Muslims who fled the violence of the preceding 
years. Id. Any Rohingya refugee who does return to Burma will be taken to Rohingya-only settlements 
that are separated from the rest of the population. Burmese officials have stated that they “can’t 
accept” citizenship as a prerequisite for the Rohingya’s return to Burma. Id. Without homes and 
without citizenship, the Rohingya refugees see little reason to return. Id.  
110  Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, supra note 68 (“The 1982 Citizenship Law is the 
linchpin for a whole set of laws, policies and practices that discriminate against Rohingyas as non-
citizens and leaves them extremely vulnerable to human rights abuses by government and non-
government actors. These include systematic and severe restrictions on Rohingya freedom of 
movement, marriage restrictions, birth and population control. These restrictions limit Rohingya 
access to health, education, livelihoods and family life”). See also Abdelkader, supra note 33, at 399 
(“Over 120,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are currently living in temporary shelters with 
limited access to food, medical care, sanitation facilities, and other types of humanitarian necessities”). 
Since 2012, approximately 140,000 Rohingya were taken to IDP camps, either because they were 
displaced by violence or because they were forced to relocate by security forces. See Zarni, supra note 
6, at 706. Within those camps, the Rohingya have been “subject to a whole set of restrictions that do 
not apply to the rest of the population of Rakhine State . . . they experience disproportionately more 
poverty, under-development, restrictive and discriminatory policies, and human rights abuses.” Id. 
Furthermore, “within these areas in which the Rohingya are contained, on-going attempts to control 
 












One way the UNHCR may be more successful in promoting the end of 
statelessness problem in Burma might be to change its approach from 
emphasizing the importance of nationality to emphasizing the benefits the 
Burmese government may receive from expanding citizenship to the 
Rohingya Muslims.111 This shift will require an understanding of the 
possible reasons why the Burmese government is averse to expanding 
citizenship in the first place.112 With this understanding, the UNHCR may 
help the Burmese government implement some transitional justice options 
that may hold the Burmese military accountable for its crimes against 
humanity.113 After removing the Burmese military’s influence over the 
                                                                                                                              
marriages and prevent births demonstrate the intention to destroy the Rohingya.” Id. As of September 
2018, “[a]n estimated 235,000 persons remained internally displaced by violence in Kachin, Rakhine, 
and northern Shan States.” Burma 2018 Human Rights Report, supra note 58, at 29. The Burmese 
government “limited health and education services and livelihood opportunities through severe and 
systematic restrictions on movement.” Id. 
111  Higgins, supra note 88, at 111-112 (explaining the possible transitional justice options the 
Burmese government may take to resolve the current crisis in Burma). Another solution may be to 
improve partnerships between “the affected population, the State, civil society and other UN, 
international and regional organizations.” UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note: 
UNHCR, Division of International Protection, March 2010, 22 INT’L J. REFUGEE LAW 297, 313 
(2010). Successful responses to ending statelessness hinges on full engagement of civil society actors, 
especially national NGOs, academic institutions, legal aid organizations, religious institutions, trade 
and workers organizations, and the media. Id. Along with the fieldwork and peacekeeping missions of 
OHCHR, UNICEF, UNFPA, and UNDP, development programs under “the Common Country 
Assessment (CCA), the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Delivering as One 
initiatives are of relevance” to promote non-discrimination and inclusion of stateless populations. Id. 
Since statelessness is linked to migration in the case of the Rohingya Muslims, regional “organizations 
and institutions can play a key role as fora for standard-setting, advocacy and awareness-raising” 
through regional treaties. Id. However, the United Nations and other organizations already have 
attempted to foster these regional partnerships, and there has not been much progress or success in 
doing so, which may mean that such partnerships alone will not resolve the issues surrounding 
discrimination and violence against the Rohingya Muslims. See infra notes 123-124.  
112 There are four possible reasons why the Burmese government refuses to address the 
humanitarian crisis against the Rohingya Muslims: (1) fear of the Burmese military which has 
collapsed civilian governments in the past; (2) government officials agree with the anti-Rohingya 
sentiments found throughout the State’s official documents and informally in the region for hundreds 
of years; (3) fear of electoral backlash since the majority of the population believes the Rohingya are 
illegal immigrants and terrorists; and (4) the structure of the government gives greater authority to the 
military than the civilian government. Higgins, supra note 88, at 112-113.  
113  There are several transitional justice options the Burmese government may take against the 
Burmese military; however, these options presume that it is the Burmese military alone that is to blame 
for the violence towards and persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. Higgins, supra note 88, at 113. 
Rather than hold a criminal trial, the Burmese government can create a truth and reconciliation 
commission, which could assess either or both the violence occurring in the Rakhine State beginning 
in August 2017 to the present and the entitlement of the Rohingyas to citizenship. Id. at 114. The 
Burmese government could exile or purge the perpetrators of the atrocities against the Rohingya; 
however, this will not do much to encourage the Burmese government to expand citizenship because 
removing some members of the military may not change overarching anti-Rohingya sentiments in the 














government, the UNHCR may have greater success in carrying out 
reforms to the 1982 Citizenship Law and convincing Burma to become a 
signatory of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions; however, the Burmese 
government is unlikely to take action against its own military.114  
B. Sanctions or Other International Intervention 
 
Other solutions may include sanctioning the Burmese government and 
military and addressing the issue in international courts. On June 25, 2018, 
“the European Union and Canada announced sanctions on seven Myanmar 
military officials . . . freezing their assets within European and Canadian 
jurisdictions and banning them from traveling to Europe and doing 
business with Canada.”115 On August 17, 2018, the U.S. Treasury 
Department announced it imposed economic sanctions on four Burmese 
security commanders and two military units for their role in ethnic 
cleansing and other human rights abuses against the Rohingya.116 So far, 
most of the sanctions have been imposed on military and government 
officials rather than on the Burmese government as a whole or on 
businesses linked to the military.117 
                                                                                                                              
government formally prosecuted the persecutors of the atrocities; although, a public trial may help to 
change the narrative the military has created towards the Rohingya Muslims, and a direct contradiction 
of the military’s labelling of the Rohingya Muslims as “terrorists” may alleviate some of the negative 
tensions the majority of the population has against the Rohingya Muslims. Id. at 116.  
114  Since the Burmese military has a permanent “seat at the table of government” from the 2008 
constitutional amendment, and since the Burmese government fears a coup, the Burmese government 
is unlikely to change its position on the Rohingya Muslims and will continue to pursue policies that 
deprive them of opportunities to gain citizenship and rights. Higgins, supra note 88, at 125. 
115  Conor Finnegan, When Europe, Canada slapped new sanctions on Myanmar over Rohingya 
treatment, where was US?, ABC NEWS (July 8, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/International/europe-
canada-slapped-sanctions-myanmar-rohingya-treatment-us/story?id=56441577. 
116  Edward Wong, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Myanmar Military Over Rohingya Atrocities, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/myanmar-sanctions-
rohingya.html. Although the United States has imposed some sanctions, the Trump administration has 
refused to label the atrocities in Burma as a “genocide,” despite overwhelming evidence found from an 
investigation by the State Department and bipartisan support in the House of Representatives to hold 
Burma accountable for its actions. Conor Finnegan, House Republicans lead vote to label Rohingya 
crisis 'genocide' in rebuke to Trump administration's silence, ABC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/house-republicans-lead-vote-label-rohingya-crisis-
genocide/story?id=59729449. Although the United States has donated almost $300 million in aid for 
Rohingya refugees, many believe the United States should be doing more to “galvanize international 
action to investigate Myanmar’s atrocities.” Id. With the Trump administration’s silence on the 
Rohingya crisis, it is unclear whether the United States will do anything to alleviate the plight of the 
Rohingya Muslims. Id.  
117  Simon Marks, EU weighs new sanctions against Myanmar over Rohingya, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 
2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-weighs-new-sanctions-against-myanmar-over-rohingya/ 
(noting that countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands have opted to sanction 
 












It is unclear whether these sanctions will have any effect on the 
Rohingya refugee crisis, as certain sanctions often are ineffective and can 
result in disruptions that exacerbate poverty in countries already struggling 
with economic growth.118 Sanctions imposed in the 1990s aimed to change 
Burma’s policies to favor democracy, which were lifted around 2012 when 
Burma’s government indicated a commitment to democracy and human 
rights protections; however, despite having a democratic government, the 
military continues to play an important role in policy making.119 As with 
any military government, Burma may be able to support itself with 
domestic and foreign resources, sufficient to withstand sanctions and 
continue making anti-Rohingya policies.120 As such, even with targeted 
                                                                                                                              
specific individuals in the government and in the military rather than impose financial or trade 
sanctions so that economic development in Burma is not disrupted). 
118  There is a difference between unilateral sanctions and constructive engagement. Unilateral 
sanctions are imposed on a target country by one or several countries hoping to change the target 
country’s policies; however, the target country is often undemocratic and undeveloped, leading to no 
policy changes and poorer living conditions. In contrast, constructive engagement imposes sanctions 
on specific individuals in order to promote policy changes, and unlike unilateral sanctions, 
constructive engagement aims to improve living conditions in the target country and cooperate with 
other countries to achieve the desired result. Joshua L. Savey, Unilateral Sanctions: An Effective 
Foreign Policy Tool in Myanmar?, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 372-374 (2014) (discussing the 
history of U.S. sanctions against Burma beginning in the 1990s, the ineffectiveness of unilateral 
sanctions in U.S. foreign policy, and the more desirable results reached once the United States began 
using constructive engagement in 2012). 
119  See Higgins, supra note 88, at 105-106 (describing how civilian governments have been 
replaced by the military several times throughout Burmese history and how the military continues to 
have significant influence in the government). The Burmese military announced “its so-called roadmap 
to democracy in 2003,” resulting in a “multistage transition to a civilian government.” Eleanor Albert, 
How Myanmar’s Military Wields Power From the Shadows, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 
2, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/interview/how-myanmars-military-wields-power-shadows.  In reality, 
the military choreographed “a transition in which a pseudocivilian government comes to power but 
holds a delicate power-sharing agreement with the military.” Id. In accordance with this power-sharing 
agreement, the Burmese “military appoints 25 percent of parliamentary seats,” and they control the 
domestic, border affairs, and defense ministries. Id. While the civilian government echoes the 
military’s anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim rhetoric, the Burmese military is the main perpetrator of the 
atrocities and ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims. Id. The Burmese military has positioned 
itself so that it can execute its campaign against the Rohingya Muslims while the civilian government 
takes the blame. Id. Furthermore, the Burmese military is able to do so without harming its own 
political and economic interests. Id. However, the civilian government is not entirely faultless, as it has 
enabled the military’s violence by failing to condemn the atrocities committed and denounce the hate 
speech, which only fuels the divisions between the Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslims. Id. 
120  Savey, supra note 118, at 372. Sanctions have had some effect on the Burmese economy, as 
foreign direct investments and tourism have decreased in the past year because the “country’s image is 
declining.” Philip Heijmans, Sanctions Squeeze Myanmar’s Economy, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-01-31/western-sanctions-squeezing-
myanmars-economy. However, Western sanctions seems to have caused the Burmese government to 
recalibrate its economic policies in favor of a regional approach, turning to Eastern countries like 














sanctions to government and military officials, Burma may not change its 
course without a threat of greater ramifications.121 
There have been mixed results from other international intervention. In 
the UN Security Council (“Security Council”), China and Russia have 
“argued that the crisis requires a long-term, patient approach rather than 
pressure, and must be resolved through bilateral diplomatic efforts.”122 
Despite opposition in the Security Council, on July 4, 2019, the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Prosecutor requested the Court to 
open an investigation, which was approved on November 14, 2019.123 
                                                                                                                              
Burma “signed an agreement with China’s state-run investment firm CITIC Group to begin work on a 
$1.3 billion deep-sea port in Rakhine State” in addition to pledging “to push forward the building of 
the China-Myanmar economic corridor under China's One Belt, One Road Initiative.” Id. The 
government is also trying to remedy the decline in tourism by attempting to attract regional customers 
and travelers. Id.  
121  Id. Another reason why United States sanctions may be ineffective is the fact that the United 
States has not been fully enforcing the sanctions that it has in place by issuing visa waivers to children 
of the military officers who are being sanctioned. Nahal Toosi, U.S. not fully enforcing Myanmar 
sanctions, documents show, POLITICO (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/10/myanmar-sanctions-rohingya-united-states-congress-
773358. By waiving certain sanctions, the United States may send the message the Burmese military 
may ultimately will get away with the atrocities it has committed against the Rohingya Muslims. Id.  
One senator has expressed a concern over the appropriateness of these visa waivers considering the 
human rights abuses and political oppression perpetrated by the Burmese government. Id.  
122  Myanmar’s Refugee Problem among World’s Worst Humanitarian, Human Rights Crises, 
Secretary-General Says in Briefing to Security Council, UNITED NATIONS: MEETINGS COVERAGE AND 
PRESS RELEASES (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13469.doc.htm. China has long 
supported the Burmese military, providing it with weapons and training, so it is unlikely that the 
Security Council will authorize prosecution for the crimes committed in Burma. Higgins, supra note 
88, at 118. See also Joshua Carroll, Why the UN failed to save the Rohingya, AL JAZEERA (July 28, 
2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/united-nations-failed-save-rohingya-
190628024749391.html; UN fails to take action on order against Myanmar on Rohingya, AL JAZEERA 
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/fails-action-order-myanmar-rohingyas-
200205020402316.html 
123  Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, requests judicial 
authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar, ICC-OTP-
20190704-PR1465 (July 4, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1465 (explaining 
background and contents of ICC Prosecutor’s request). Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC judges 
authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar, ICC-CPI-20191114-
PR1495 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1495 (explaining ICC’s 
jurisdiction and breadth of investigation). However, the Burmese government has claimed the ICC’s 
investigation “is not in accordance with international law.” Myanmar rejects ICC probe into alleged 
crimes against Rohingya, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/myanmar-rejects-icc-probe-alleged-crimes-rohingya-
191115180754984.html. 
While there is sufficient evidence for the ICC to indict members of the Burmese military for war 
crimes, which violates Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over 
Burma because it is not a signatory. Higgins, supra note 88, at 118. “The Rome Statute provides 
jurisdiction in three circumstances: crimes committed in the territory of a state party, crimes 
committed by a national of a state party, and crimes in a jurisdiction that has been specifically 
authorized by the UN Security Council.” Id. at 119.  Since Burma is not a signatory, the ICC cannot 
 












Around the same time, on November 11, 2019, the Republic of the 
Gambia brought suit against Burma, calling the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) to determine whether Burma violated the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.124 On January 
23, 2020, the ICJ ordered Burma to “take all measures within its power” to 
prevent the genocide of the Rohingya Muslims.125 However, it is difficult 
to determine whether the ICJ ruling will have any effect on the Rohingya 
Muslims, as the Burmese government continues to deny the charges 
against it, and there is no way to enforce the ruling.126  
Help from neighboring states is also unlikely, especially from 
Bangladesh, because the costs of taking in the Rohingya refugees is too 
high.127 In September 2018, an “Independent International Fact-Finding 
                                                                                                                              
assert personal or territorial jurisdiction over the country. Id. However, in September 2018, the ICC 
determined that jurisdiction over this specific issue may be allowed because Bangladesh is a signatory 
of the Rome Statute. Id. at 120. As such, the ICC may be able to investigate the “deportation of 
members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh” and “related crimes such as 
persecution and inhumane acts.” Id. There has yet to be a prosecution following this decision. Id. at 
121. 
124  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(The Gambia v. Myanmar), Order, No. 178 ¶ 1 (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
125  “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar shall, in accordance with its obligations under the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in relation to the members of 
the Rohingya group in its territory, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all 
acts within the scope of Article II of this Convention, in particular: (a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” Id. at ¶ 86. The ICJ further 
ordered Burma to ensure that the military and other armed groups do not commit or conspire to 
commit genocide, that measures be taken to prevent the destruction of evidence, and that a report be 
submitted to the Court regarding the application of the provisional measurers. Id. 
See also Myanmar Rohingya: Government rejects ICJ ruling, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51229796; David J. Scheffer, Why the ICJ Is Trying to Protect 
Myanmar’s Rohingya, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 24, 2020),  https://www.cfr.org/article/why-
icj-trying-protect-myanmars-rohingya; Aman Ullah, International Court of Justice and Rohingya 
Issue, Canadian Rohingya Development Initiative, https://www.rohingya.ca/international-court-of-
justice-and-rohingya-issue/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).  
126  See BBC News, supra note 125. See also Mia Swart, Will Myanmar respect ICJ order to 
protect Rohingya from genocide?, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/myanmar-respect-icj-order-stop-genocide-rohingya-
200123144204115.html; Andrew Nachemson, ‘As expected’: People in Myanmar shrug off ICJ 
Rohingya ruling, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/expected-
people-myanmar-shrug-icj-rohingya-ruling-200127065507541.html.  
127  Neighboring states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) either do not 
acknowledge the Rohingya crisis or overtly support the Burmese government and its military’s 
actions. “China, with its long ties to the Tatmadaw and substantial economic interests in the country, 
has been a steadfast supporter of Myanmar, and Thailand has even recently awarded Myanmar's army 














Mission (FFM) on Myanmar, sanctioned by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council in March 2017, submitted a damning 440-page report” 
detailing the atrocities of the Burmese military.128 The report spurred some 
western countries like Australia, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom to condemn Burma and issue sanctions, but there was either no 
reaction from neighboring countries or the opposite reaction where 
neighboring countries refused help to the Rohingya.129 Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the international community will provide any viable solutions 
for the Rohingya crisis in the near future.130  
Lastly, while it is important to hold the Burmese government and 
military accountable for the atrocities that were committed against the 
Rohingya Muslims, this accountability will not address the root cause for 
the Rohingya Muslims’ stateless status: the anti-Rohingya sentiments need 
to be combatted, and the 1982 Citizenship Law needs to be reformed in 
order for there to be a permanent resolution to the matter.131  
 
C. Improvements to the Refugee Relief 
 
Since the likelihood of the Burmese government changing its anti-
Rohingya position and the likelihood of the international community 
enforcing UNHCR policies or court decisions are slim, the least that can 
                                                                                                                              
under-resourced nation,” wishes to return the Rohingya refugees to Burma rather than continue to 
support them. Higgins, supra note 88, at 123-125. 
128  Angshuman Choudhury, Why Are Myanmar’s Neighbors Ignoring the Rohingya Crisis?, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Sept. 25, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/why-are-myanmars-neighbors-ignoring-
the-rohingya-crisis/ (detailing silence from ASEAN, China, India, and others). 
129  Id. See also Aisha Ismail & Elliot Dolan-Evans, The International Community’s Response to 
the Rohingya Crisis, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS (Sept. 12, 2017), 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/international-community-response-rohingya/ 
(explaining responses from India, China, the UN, United States, and the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation). While some countries have sanctioned, condemned, and sent foreign ministers to Burma 
to talk, “condemnations alone are not enough. The international community must adopt a two-pronged 
approach to assisting the Rohingya. Firstly, punitive measures, such as sanctions should be taken 
against the government of Myanmar to demonstrate that the international community firmly denounces 
the actions of the Tatmadaw. Secondly, and most importantly, the international community must take 
immediate action to alleviate the suffering of the Rohingya people by providing humanitarian relief 
and proactively assisting the Rohingya in seeking asylum.” Id.  
130  Higgins, supra note 88, at 126.  
131  See supra notes 68-72 (arguing that the 1982 Citizenship Law should “include naturalisation 
procedures that are fair, reasonable and accessible to those who have a clear link to Myanmar,” “be 
implemented in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner,” and “not reinforce hierarchies of 
citizenship through different categories of citizenship such as ‘full citizen’, ‘associate citizen’ and 
‘naturalised citizen’. All citizens should have the same access to rights in Myanmar”). 












be done for the Rohingya Muslims is to improve the relief given to them 
in the interim until some other solution becomes available.132  
The largest improvement needed for refugee relief for the Rohingya 
Muslims is creating safer, more sanitary camps and increasing funding for 
resources. The refugee camps are heavily populated and vulnerable to 
natural disasters, and life-saving emergency response requires upgrading 
to achieve coverage and quality care.133 Congestion, malnutrition, 
contaminated water, disease outbreaks, psychological issues, lack of fuel, 
and gender and sexual abuse are amongst the highest priority issues that 
continue to require greater resources.134 The influx of refugees has lowered 
living conditions in Bangladesh even further, with wages dropping, 
increased prices for basic needs and food, crumbling infrastructure, 
displacement, and higher percentages of people in poverty and extreme 
poverty.135 These needs cannot be addressed without proper funding, and 
the UNHCR still has almost $279 million of unmet requirements through 
the total Joint Response Plan for 2019.136  
One possibility for alleviating these issues would be to spread the costs 
and have other surrounding countries take in the Rohingya refugees so that 
the majority of the burden is not on Bangladesh; however, this option 
seems unlikely as the majority of the neighboring countries support the 
Burmese government.137 Another possibility is to increase private 
donations through charities.138 
 
 
                                                        
132  Higgins, supra note 88, at 125-126. 
133  Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis: March 2018 – December 2018, 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, at 10, 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/JRP%20for%20Rohingya%20Humanitarian%20Crisis%20
2018.PDF (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
134  Id. at 13-16.  
135  Id. at 16-18.  
136  Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2018 (Other), UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (updated 2019), 
https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/656/summary.  
137  See supra note 127. 
138  There are several organizations responding to the Rohingya crisis that accept charitable 
donations: BRAC, IOM, Action Against Hunger, UNICEF, Save the Children, Doctors Without 
Borders, International Rescue Committee, UNHCR, and the World Food Program. Tiffany May, 















Despite the magnitude of the Rohingya refugee and statelessness crises, 
it seems unlikely for any solutions to be reached in the near future.139 
Without permanent reform of the 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya will 
continue to be persecuted in Burma, which will lead to further 
displacement and greater threats of genocide.140 Lacking the support of the 
United States and the rest of the international community only exacerbates 
the issue, as the Burmese government and its military are not being held 
accountable for their atrocities.141 Since national governments are 
unwilling to take action against Burma, and international organizations 
and agencies are limited by their resources and jurisdictional provisions, it 
is even more essential for private individuals and organizations to fill in 
the gaps and provide for the needs of the Rohingya Muslims.142  
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